CCP's Economic Crimes
 
During the ensuing two years, political liberalization enhanced economic corruption among the "prince and princess gang", with Zhao Dajun [i.e., Zhao Ziyang's son] and Deng Pufang [Deng Xiaoping's son] becoming the prime targets of the students. Hu's death in 1989 would trigger the Second Students' Movement which ended in the June 4th Massacre of 1989. During the Second Students' Movement, students mounted attacks at the phenomenon of "guan dao" [i.e., commodity resale by governmentally sponsored organizations] and blamed it on the princeling party. Complicating the corruption issue would be price hike of major consumer products around the turn of the year. Yuan Mu, i.e., some speaker of CCP Central, would become the most hated communist cadre for his TV-broadcasted message of "price adjustment".
 
http://www.secretchina.com/news/articles/4/5/29/65847.html carried an article in regards to the nature of "guan dao", stating that it was CCP Central's evil "two track system" that led to "guan dao", not princeling party. CCP Central, at the time of economic reform in mid-1980s, distributed "production & consumption materials" to "state enterprises" at planned-economy price and to "non state enterprises" at market-determined price. The category of "non state enterprises" would include mostly sub-regional factories or working units, like shire-township enterprises [i.e., "xiang-zhen"]. (In section on 'All-People Registers' vs 'Collective Registers', we used Ma Hong's Economic Annals to define the "inferior" Collective Register Enterprises as those that did not enjoy government subsidy.)
 
Similar to the agri-industrial scissor differential that discriminated against peasant entity [non-privileged class] versus city dweller entity [privileged class], CCP Central's "two track system" served the only purpose of differentiating further between privileged class and lesser-privileged class. Princeling party or "prince and princess gang", with firm grip of the Nation's "production & consumption materials", could easily make a living by signing "referral letters" or selling "surplus materials" for a market gain.
 
After the Tian'an'men Square Massacre, communists found another game, i.e., the land enclosure movement that would see the peasants deprived of their fields at non-market rate in the name of urbanization and industrialization as well as the city dwellers forced to relocate on the pretext of "remodeling on the dilapidated houses". Communist leadership, in collaboration with capitalists, had been making windfall profits in selling land development permits or sub-contracting construction projects like skyscrapers, so-called 'noble' district for single-family residencies, high-rise luxury condominiums and shopping centers.
 
Land, a resource owned by the State [i.e., CCP], was always a taboo topic prior to Deng Xiaoping's post-massacre "relaunching economic reform with a southern tour of SEZs [special economic zones]". Having brought to US the newspaper clips from "World Economic Journal" spanning multiple years, I finally threw them away. Nobody had really been able to predict the massive "land enclosure movement" that occurred in China after 1989 massacre. Neither did Wang Juntao's "Economics Weekly" make a good forecast on the subject.
 
Heralding "economic positivism" since 1987, Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao and their "Social, Economical & Scientific Research Institute of Peking" played two constructive roles, i) calling attention to social, economic & political crises, and ii) transplanting Western economic theories and concepts, including stagflation, development economics, corporations as legal entity [i.e., "economic person"], existence of economic cycle in socialist economies, welfare system, and income distribution, government subsidy to city-dwellers. Wang Juntao, in 1988-1989, was wrongly pointing to "economic interests" as the barrier to internal reform by communists, not "political conservativism". 15 years later, at a forum (http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/4/6/4/n558888.htm), Wu Renhua, with Wang Juntao & Wang Dan, would have to agree on the fact that China's path to democracy and freedom could be even more tenuous due to a mutant communist party built on top of "economic interests" rather than of "ideological perseverance". 15 years after the massacre, against the context of world-wide rising price in copper, scrap metals, oil and cement [pulled by strong demand from China] would be the following scenes: state-owned enterprises had been dissipating into the hands of a handful; young or middle-aged workers were terminated employment in exchange for one-time payout; peasant migrant workers succeeded the most hazardous jobs in mines and factories; and hundreds of thousands of peasant children swamped to coastal economic zones as slave labor or child labor. In the background would be breaking families, predatory and selfish human character, and morally degenerate society.